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Introduction 
 
Where are Britain’s Googles, Apples and Amgens? Why has Britain, 
despite its well-regarded universities and its many Nobel Prize-
winning scientists, produced so few world-leading companies in 
science-based and high-technology industries?  
Britain’s lag in these industries has been a matter of concern for 
policy-makers throughout the post-war period, and it continues to 
figure in the current debate about the new Government’s Industrial 
Strategy.  
As part of this debate, attention has focused on the reasons for US 
supremacy in most of the high-technology industries that have come 
to the fore since the war, and on how far the factors which underpin 
that success can be replicated in Britain. 
This paper seeks to shed light on these questions by looking at two 
sectors where US firms have markedly out-performed their British 
rivals - information technology and biotechnology. The aim is not to 
provide a comprehensive history of these two sectors but to 
highlight some of the distinctive features of the American business 
environment, including the role of government, which have 
contributed to US leadership.     
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Information technology 
 
The early post-war years  
In the years following the Second World War, the US Government 
committed itself to large-scale support for scientific research. The 
thinking was that, just as science had played a crucial role in the war 
(for example, in the Manhattan project that led to the atomic bomb), 
so in peacetime scientific prowess would strengthen the economy 
and help to meet society’s needs.1 Among the agencies that were 
created or enlarged after the war were the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), responsible for biomedical research, and the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), which supported research and education 
in other fields.  
Although the various institutes within the NIH had laboratories of 
their own, most of the research that these two agencies funded was 
conducted in universities. Support from public funds, on a scale that 
no other country could match, made possible a big expansion of 
university science departments. The leading research-based 
universities were responsible for several key innovations in 
information technology and biotechnology, but the universities’ 
principal contribution was to provide a stream of well-trained 
scientists and engineers upon whom these industries could draw.  
In the case of information technology, government support was 
reinforced by the purchasing policies of the Department of Defence 
(DOD). As relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated and the Cold 
War intensified, the Department formed an increasingly close 
relationship with companies whose technology could be used in 
sophisticated weaponry and other military equipment. For example, 
military requirements in such areas as missile guidance and early-
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warning radar systems stimulated the growth of the computer 
industry.2 The Department of Defence was both a large customer for 
this industry and a funder of scientific research in universities and in 
firms.                  
A further expansion of Federal support came in 1958 with the 
creation within the DOD of the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA, later renamed the Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, or DARPA). This was a response to the launch of the Soviet 
satellite Sputnik, which had raised fears the US might be losing 
ground to the Soviet Union in military-related technologies. DARPA 
had no involvement with procurement or with current military 
programmes and had no laboratories of its own, but it was charged 
with exploring frontier areas of science that were relevant to military 
needs.  
DARPA’s focus at the start was on preventing technological 
surprises, like the launch of Sputnik, and on countering the threat 
that the Soviet Union might launch missiles with nuclear capabilities 
against the continental US. The three main areas of research were 
space, missile defence and nuclear test detection, but DARPA’s space 
activities were soon transferred to the newly created National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In 1962, DARPA set 
up the Information Processing Techniques Office. This was to 
become a major funder of university research, along with the 
National Science Foundation, in the emerging discipline of computer 
science.3 One of the programmes which this office started in the 
1960s (and which was to lead to the creation of the Internet) was the 
development of a new technology known as packet switching that 
enabled computers to communicate with each other.4  
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Support for new entrants 
The beneficiaries of military spending included established 
companies such as IBM, but the DOD and DARPA actively sought to 
encourage new entrants, thus ensuring a variety of competing 
approaches to the technologies they wanted to exploit. Several of 
the firms created during the 1950s and 196Os relied initially on 
military business, and they were able to use their work for the 
Government as the basis for serving non-military markets.  
For example, following the invention of the transistor by Bell 
Laboratories in 1947, the subsequent development of the 
semiconductor industry was strongly influenced by military demand. 
Pressure from the Department of Defence and from NASA for the 
miniaturisation of electronic components boosted demand for 
integrated circuits (ICs). Fairchild Semiconductor, one of the 
inventors of this technology, was the principal supplier of ICs for the 
Apollo project. “These early purchases hastened American firms 
down the slopes of their learning curves. And the government 
insistence on second sourcing sped the diffusion of IC technology”.5   
Although the UK and other European countries invested in military-
related technologies after the war, spending by the US Government 
was on a much bigger scale, and by the 1960s the US had a world-
leading position in most branches of the information technology 
sector, including computers, semiconductors and computer software.  
By this time, commercial markets were expanding rapidly, and, while 
spending by the Department of Defence continued at a high level, 
the next phase in the growth of the sector was driven by firms such 
as Intel (founded in 1968), Microsoft (1975) and Apple (1976), which 
concentrated almost entirely on non-military markets. These three 
companies were spectacularly successful. They were followed by 
hundreds of new entrants, some of them breakaways from 
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established firms. As the sector grew in size, it attracted scientific 
and entrepreneurial talent from all over the world. In 1990, one third 
of the scientists and engineers in Silicon Valley were immigrants, 
mostly of Indian and Chinese descent.6 Some of the immigrants went 
on to build sizeable businesses. 7      
 
Growth of the IT sector  
How did the US convert its early-mover advantage, derived in part 
from military procurement, into sustained international leadership? 
Part of the answer lies in the distinctive character of the information 
technology industry as it took shape in the 1970s and 1980s and in 
the large role played by new entrepreneurial firms. It was during 
these years that the structure of the computer industry was 
transformed from the IBM model – a large, vertically integrated 
corporation covering all parts of the value chain including 
components and software – to the Silicon Valley model – a vertically 
disintegrated industry that allowed new entrants, specialising in 
particular components, to insert themselves at various points in the 
value chain.8  
The US provided a more fertile soil for firms of this type than Europe 
or Japan. A key ingredient in what became a hugely productive 
innovation system was venture capital. This was a means of financing 
start-up firms that took off more quickly in the US than in other 
countries after the war. The first non-family venture capital firm, 
American Research and Development, was founded in Boston in 
1946. Its biggest success was its investment in Digital Equipment 
Corporation, the leading manufacturer of mini-computers. Over the 
following decades the US venture capital industry supported scores 
of new entrants in information technology and in other fast-growing 
industries. The dynamism of Silicon Valley owed a great deal to the 
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presence in the region of numerous venture capital firms, some of 
them led by executives who had come out of established electronics 
companies.9  
The venture capital firms themselves were financed largely by 
institutional investors, including pension funds; the inflow of funds 
from that source increased significantly after 1979 when the rules 
governing company pension funds were changed to allow them to 
invest in more risky assets.10    
An essential complement to venture capital from the 1970s onwards 
was the emergence of a stock market, NASDAQ, whose rules and 
procedures were better suited to young, high-growth companies 
than the old-established New York and American stock exchanges.11 
Firms such as Microsoft, Apple and Cisco chose to list their shares on 
NASDAQ. This exchange fostered a community of investors, private 
and institutional, who developed a deep understanding of high-
technology industries and were willing to back early-stage firms. The 
availability of finance from outside investors at each stage in a firm’s 
development, from start-up through to public flotation, allowed the 
most promising new entrants to scale up more easily than their 
counterparts in Europe or Japan, where financial markets were less 
well developed.       
 
Entrepreneurial universities  
No less important than an accommodating financial system was the 
role of US universities in facilitating the creation of new firms. Close 
links with industry have long been a feature of the American 
university system. This dates back to the Morrill Act of 1862, which 
created land grant colleges, financed by the sale of federal land, in 
many states. Part of their mission was to support agriculture and 
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industry in their regions. Higher education in the US is also 
distinctive in its diversity, with well-endowed private universities co-
existing with strong state institutions, all of them competing for 
talent and for funds.   
A further stimulus for technology transfer from universities to 
business came in 1980 when the Bayh-Dole Act changed the rules 
governing the commercialisation of publicly funded research. 
Universities were given the freedom to patent inventions resulting 
from government-funded research and to use them as the basis for 
licensing deals with established companies or for the creation of 
spin-out firms.12 The porous boundaries between academia and 
industry in the US constitute a major source of strength for science-
based industries. As Nathan Rosenberg has written, “American 
success in high-technology sectors of the economy…..owes an 
enormous debt to the entrepreneurial activities of American 
universities”.13  
That new firms could be the source of radical innovations, and that 
barriers to entry should be kept low, has been recognised from the 
start by the Federal Government and its agencies. There has been a 
consistent determination, both by the big purchasing departments 
such as the DOD and by the antitrust agencies (the Justice 
Department and the Federal Trade Commission) to curb tendencies 
towards monopoly in any significant part of the information 
technology sector, and to widen the opportunities for new entrants.  
One example was the pressure put on IBM, at the end of the 1960s, 
to end the practice of tying the supply of software to the sale of its 
computers. The unbundling of IBM software gave a fillip to the 
growth of independent software vendors. Another example was the 
antitrust suit against Microsoft in 1998, prompted by the tactics used 
by that company to stunt the growth of Netscape, whose popular 
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browser threatened Microsoft’s dominance in the supply of 
operating software for personal computers.   
These three elements – access to finance for new firms, the 
entrepreneurial role of universities, and the promotion of 
competition – were crucial to the growth of information technology 
in the US. But the industry also benefited from supportive public 
policies.   
 
The role of public policy  
In contrast to the UK, France or Japan, the US has never had a 
centrally directed innovation policy. National security and public 
health have been the primary motivations for US technology policies 
since the Second World War.14 Government-funded research was 
important in several sectors, but there was nothing resembling a 
government-wide R & D strategy. “Agencies with particular missions 
supplied R & D dollars with little or no coordination, review or 
external oversight”.15  
It is true that in the 1980s and 1990s, when anxiety about German 
and Japanese competition was at its height, some steps were taken 
in the direction of a European-style or Japanese-style industrial 
policy.16 These included the creation of Sematech, a government-
backed consortium of semiconductor producers, coordinated and 
partly funded by DARPA. Its aim was to develop cutting-edge 
production technology that would match or surpass the methods 
used in Japan. Japanese producers had been gaining market share in 
semiconductor memory chips, raising fears in the DOD that an 
industry crucial to national security might be in decline.  
Members of the consortium found it difficult at first to agree on an 
appropriate research strategy. The focus shifted away from the 
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development of new manufacturing techniques, from which all 
member firms would benefit, towards strengthening the capabilities 
of US semiconductor equipment manufacturers, many of which were 
small and under-financed. Some progress was made on that front, 
and Sematech is widely regarded as a success. The subsequent 
resurgence of the US semiconductor industry was, however, mainly 
due to the strength of US firms, led by Intel, in the microprocessor 
segment of the market, where the Japanese were weak.17 
Another initiative, launched in 1982, was the Small Business 
Innovation Research Programme (SBIR), whereby federal agencies, 
including big funders like the NIH and the DOD, were obliged to 
allocate part of their research budgets to small firms. While some 
critics have argued that SBIR crowds out privately-funded research, a 
recent study by the National Academies of Science concluded the 
programme had been “sound in concept and efficient in operation”, 
substantially increasing the role of small firms in the 
commercialisation of government-funded research. 18 
 
Government-funded research  
These and other interventionist measures are dwarfed in importance 
by the scale and consistency of government support for scientific 
research – research that has contributed to many, but by no means 
all, of the innovations on which the US information technology 
industry has been built.19 How should that contribution be 
assessed?20  
The primary goal of the funding agencies was not to create new 
businesses but to create new knowledge that would help them fulfil 
their missions. Take, for example, the case of Google, the search 
engine company founded by Sergei Brin and Larry Page in 1998.21 
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This company has its origins in research funded by the National 
Science Foundation at Stanford. As part of its digital library initiative, 
designed to improve the science of large-scale information retrieval 
and storage, the NSF awarded a research contract to two Stanford 
professors, Hector Garcia-Molina and Terry Winograd. Brin and Page 
were PhD students who joined the two professors in 1994 and 
1995. “Founding a company was not their primary goal at that point, 
nor was it an explicit goal when the NSF first began to fund their 
work”.22  
Stanford was not the only university to receive funding under the 
NSF’s digital library programme, and there were other doctoral 
students who, like Brin and Page, came to see the commercial 
potential of their research. When Brin and Page first looked for 
financial backers, they had great difficulty in standing out from the 
crowd. Eventually, they found a San Francisco-based angel investor, 
Andy Bechtolsheim, who had been a co-founder of Sun 
Microsystems and was on the lookout for PhD students with 
interesting technological ideas.23 
 
DARPA and the Internet 
The NSF was not directly concerned with the commercial potential 
of its digital library research.  But there is another agency, DARPA, 
whose interaction with the private sector has been closer than that 
of the NSF. Although DARPA’s primary mission is military, its 
projects have contributed to major advances in information 
technology, the most spectacular example being the Internet.   
The Internet story began in the 1960s when DARPA started to 
research new information processing techniques that would enable 
computers to communicate with each other. Part of the motivation 
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for this project was to improve communication between military 
computer sites and to make the command and control system more 
resilient. Out of this work emerged the packet-switching technology 
embodied in ARPANET, a computer network designed to meet the 
needs of the armed forces and of the research community that 
served them.  
As further advances were made, some coming out of DARPA-funded 
research, some from outside sources, the managers responsible for 
the project saw that ARPANET had commercial potential. The 
involvement of commercial users would speed up the development 
of the network, to the benefit both of DARPA’s prime customer, the 
Department of Defence, and of the information technology sector as 
a whole. Control of ARPANET was transferred in 1985 to a non-
military agency, the National Science Foundation and the network 
was fully privatised in the 1990s.  
DARPA’s contribution to the Internet was based on an approach to 
technology development that is different from other funding 
agencies. It is a small, non-bureaucratic, and highly autonomous 
agency, kept separate from other parts of the Department of 
Defence, and it uses what has been called the island-bridge model. 
The innovative entity is located on an island, free from the 
bureaucratic pressures of the parent organisation; but it also has a 
bridge to senior decision-makers – in DARPA’s case, the Secretary of 
Defence - who can press the innovation forward and provide the 
necessary resources.24  
DARPA’s programme managers are charged with identifying 
technological problems that, if solved, will enhance national security, 
but which go well beyond existing practice and knowledge; they are 
interested in transformational, not incremental, innovation. Once the 
problem has been identified, DARPA looks for experts in the chosen 
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area and brings them together to work out an agreed approach. The 
experts are drawn from industry and academia, and DARPA has 
made extensive use of start-up firms that are often better equipped 
to tackle “out of the box” research projects than established 
companies; neither IBM nor A T & T showed much interest in 
ARPANET in its early stage.  
Erica Fuchs, a US academic, has described DARPA’s approach as “a 
new form of technology policy, in which embedded government 
agents re-architect social networks among researchers so as to 
identify and influence new technology directions in the US to 
achieve an organisational goal”.  These agents “do not give way to 
the invisible hand of markets, nor do they step in with top-down 
bureaucracy to pick technology winners. Instead, they are in 
constant contact with the research community, understanding 
emerging themes, matching these emerging themes to military 
needs”.25   
DARPA’s approach has been remarkably successful (although there 
have also been numerous failures), and it has prompted several 
attempts to apply the same model to non-military areas. In 2009, the 
Department of Energy set up the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) to fund energy technology projects.26 
Some observers questioned this decision, pointing out that DARPA 
had a single client and could directly influence, through the 
Department of Defence, the implementation of whatever usable 
technologies emerged from its research. The energy market was 
more diverse. It had many long-established technologies that might 
have to be displaced by novel approaches coming out of ARPA-E and 
many powerful vested interests committed to existing methods. 
ARPA-E is much smaller than DARPA – it has an annual budget of 
about $300m compared to DARPA’s $3bn - and is unlikely to have 
the same transformative impact on energy as DARPA has had in 
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information technology. Nevertheless, the new agency appears to 
have made good progress in its first few years and continues to enjoy 
Congressional support.  
 
Diversity and competition 
Whatever the outcome of this and other DARPA clones, there is no 
doubt that DARPA itself has played a catalytic role in information 
technology. But it is only one of several sources of government 
support, and this diversity of funding has been a source of strength 
in the US innovation system. As a review of government support for 
computer research pointed out a few years ago, “Federal funding 
agencies differ widely in their cultures, goals, resources and 
perspectives, and thus in the kinds of research projects they support. 
The result has been a federal research establishment that has 
nurtured diverse approaches to research”.27 
Diversity and competition are hallmarks of the US innovation system 
– among funding agencies, among universities that compete against 
each other for talent and for funds, among innovation clusters such 
as those based in San Francisco and Boston and among firms.  
In the case of the Internet, a government agency explored 
technological possibilities that were too speculative to interest the 
private sector, but, as Shane Greenstein has written in his history of 
the project, “the commercial era of the Internet played to the 
strength of market-based innovation. It permitted decentralised 
exploration from commercial firms facing a wide array of incentives 
and a wide variety of idiosyncratic circumstances”. The result was “a 
dizzying array of applications that were not envisaged by the 
sponsoring government agencies”.28 
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The US innovation system rests on two pillars: massive government 
support for basic and applied research, including technology that is 
too risky for the private sector, and an intensely competitive 
business environment that promotes a variety of approaches to 
commercialisation.   
 
Implications for the UK 
For the UK, catching up with the US in branches of information 
technology where American firms have already established a leading 
position is not a feasible objective. That was a lesson learned in the 
1960s and 1970s when the British Government tried without 
success to build national champions in computers and other areas. 
What governments can do is to improve the organisation of publicly 
funded research and to create an environment conducive to the 
creation and growth of new firms. As ARM has shown in 
microprocessor design, and Raspberry Pi in low-priced computers, 
there is no lack of opportunities available in parts of the market that 
are not dominated by US-based firms.   
In the UK, most public funding for research is channelled through the 
seven Research Councils, which have traditionally enjoyed a high 
degree of autonomy in deciding which projects to support. There is 
also a separate agency, Innovate UK (formerly the Technology 
Strategy Board), which supports near-market research, generally on 
the basis that half the cost of the project will be borne by the 
recipient company.     
Under plans announced by the Cameron Government in 2016, the 
Research Councils and Innovate UK were brought together in a new 
organisation, UK Research and Innovation. The new structure, the 
Government said, would provide “a greater focus and capacity to 
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deliver on cross-cutting issues that are outside the core remits of the 
current funding bodies”.29 It would also improve collaboration 
between the research base and business.  
When Theresa May became Prime Minister in July 2016, following 
the EU referendum, she announced plans for a new Industrial 
Strategy Challenge Fund that would “draw on the experience of 
DARPA….and focus on the challenges, opportunities and 
technologies that have the potential to transform existing industries 
and create entirely new ones”. 30   
How far the Government plans to go in a DARPA-like direction is not 
yet clear. It is possible that the Government will want to infuse UK 
Research and Innovation with the mission to identify and address 
technological challenges that go beyond the scope of the research 
councils. An alternative would be to set up an entirely new body with 
a DARPA-like purpose and organisation. Any such body would have 
to be given substantial autonomy, connected to but independent of 
its sponsoring government department.   
Whatever changes are made in the structure and organisation of 
research funding, support for the science base will remain a central 
ingredient in UK innovation policy. But if the Government wants to 
improve the commercialisation of publicly funded research, it must 
focus most of its attention on other features of the US business 
environment – access to finance for young, high-growth firms, 
making universities more entrepreneurial, and the promotion of 
competition.  
  




Biotechnology in the context of this paper32 refers to a set of 
techniques, sometimes described as genetic engineering, whereby 
living organisms are manipulated or modified to make new products. 
These techniques, born out of earlier scientific advances in molecular 
biology and genetics, came to the fore in the 1970s and opened up a 
novel approach to drug discovery.  
In 1973, two American scientists, Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer, 
invented the recombinant DNA or gene-splicing process, which 
made it possible to transfer genes from one organism to another. 
Another breakthrough came three years later in the UK, when César 
Milstein and Georges Köhler found a way of making monoclonal 
antibodies, which recognise and attach to specific molecules, marking 
them for destruction by the body’s immune system.  
These techniques, which were soon put to use in drug discovery, had 
little in common with the chemistry-based methods on which the 
established pharmaceutical companies – generally referred to as Big 
Pharma - mainly relied. Partly for that reason, these companies were 
slow to recognise the importance of biotechnology and left the field 
open to new entrants. The application of biotechnology to medicine 
was largely driven by newly formed entrepreneurial firms, many  
founded or co-founded by academic scientists. In that respect, the 
growth of biotechnology in the US had some similarities with what 
had happened earlier in semiconductors, although the links with 
academic science were much closer.       
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The US had no monopoly over the science on which biotechnology 
was based, but American entrepreneurs were quicker to exploit the 
new techniques than their counterparts in other countries and  went 
on to establish a dominant position in the world market.  Today, 
despite strenuous efforts by other countries to catch up, US-based 
firms are even more pre-eminent in biotechnology than in 
information technology.    
 
The US as first-mover  
That US firms were the first movers might be regarded, in part, as a 
matter of luck – the fact that recombinant DNA was invented in the 
US and proved easier to commercialise than monoclonal antibodies, a 
British discovery. But, as in information technology, the American 
pioneers had the benefit of a supportive domestic environment. 
Access to finance was available from a growing venture capital 
industry, and investors had a route to public markets through 
NASDAQ. The practice of academics leaving universities to found 
new businesses was an established part of the business scene. In 
both these areas the US was a long way ahead of Europe and Japan.   
The most successful of the pioneering firms, often seen as the role 
model for the rest of the sector, was Genentech. This firm was 
founded in San Francisco in 1976 by Robert Swanson, a venture 
capitalist, and Herbert Boyer, co-inventor of recombinant DNA. Seed 
finance came from Kleiner Perkins, a leading venture capital firm 
which had earlier been active in electronics. Tom Perkins, one of the 
firm’s partners, took on the role of chairman.   
Swanson’s plan was to use recombinant DNA to produce and sell 
drugs, but this would take time and money. In the meantime, to 
generate revenue, he sought partnerships with pharmaceutical 
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companies which would use Genentech’s technology to complement 
their own research. Insulin, a treatment for diabetes, was seen as a 
promising candidate for the new cloning technology.33 Insulin was 
derived from the pancreases of pigs and cows, and Eli Lilly, the 
principal producer, feared that supplies from that source might not 
keep pace with the increase in the diabetic population. Animal-
derived insulin also caused allergic reactions in some patients.  In 
1978, Lilly signed a twenty-year agreement with Genentech whereby 
it acquired worldwide rights to manufacture and market human 
insulin using the young firm’s technology.34  
This agreement put Genentech on a more solid financial footing. It 
also set the pattern for future relationships between biotech and Big 
Pharma; licensing deals, contract research and other forms of 
collaboration became vital sources of finance for biotech firms.  
As Genentech was getting into its stride, there were two potential 
roadblocks that might have held back the growth of the sector.  One 
was uncertainty over whether organisms created by genetic 
engineering could or should be patented. It was not until 1980 that 
the legal position was clarified when the US Supreme Court, in the 
Chakrabarty case, ruled that living organisms engineered by man 
were potentially patentable under existing statutes.  
The other concern related to the risks of genetic engineering, the 
fear that the cloning of genes could get out of control and cause an 
environmental disaster through the release of superbugs. The need 
for safeguards was generally accepted within the scientific 
community, and the form they should take was discussed at a 
conference at Asilomar in California in 1975. The outcome was a 
sixteen-month moratorium during which the National Institutes of 
Health worked out a set of guidelines for genetic engineering 
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experiments. The guidelines were permissive enough not to impede 
the growth of biotechnology firms in the US.35   
 
Investor attitudes 
By 1980, anxiety surrounding the risks of cloning gave way to a 
sense of optimism among politicians, commentators and investors 
about the potential of the new techniques to transform the 
treatment of disease. The age of ‘biomania’ was dawning.36  When 
Genentech was floated on NASDAQ in October 1980, the share 
price rose from $35 to $89 within twenty minutes and closed the 
day at $71. It was one of the most spectacular IPOs in Wall Street 
history. The Genentech IPO, as Tom Perkins remarked 
later,“established the idea that you could start a new biotechnology 
company, raise obscene amounts of money, hire good employees, 
sell stock to the public. Our competitors started doing all that”.37  
There were thirty-nine biotechnology flotations between 1980 and 
1983, then a pause for breath as investors began to look more 
critically at what they were buying into, followed by a revival of 
interest in 1986 and 1987 that allowed several more firms to go 
public. This was a foretaste of the volatility that would affect stock 
market attitudes to biotechnology throughout its history. 
Genentech’s insulin was approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration in 1982. This was followed by a series of drug 
introductions by other firms, some of them involving partnerships 
with pharmaceutical companies. Amgen, destined to become the 
largest and most profitable of the first generation firms, launched its 
first blockbuster drug, a treatment for anaemia branded Epogen, in 
1989.38  
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Most of the first biotech-based drugs were developed for 
therapeutic applications that were known and understood, such as 
insulin and human growth hormone, and used new manufacturing 
methods that made the drugs more readily available. These came to 
be described as “low-hanging fruit”, generating high returns for the 
firms that produced them and for their investors. Although there 
were a number of setbacks – monoclonal antibody technology 
proved more difficult to commercialise than expected – there were 
enough successes in the early years to keep investors interested and 
to attract more scientists and entrepreneurs into the field. By the 
end of the 1980s, US biotechnology had established a momentum of 
growth which was to see it through the ups and downs of the next 
two decades.    
 
Growth of the US biotech sector 
A distinctive feature of biotechnology, as the industry evolved, was 
the increasing concentration of innovative activity in a few regional 
clusters, of which the most important were in San Francisco and 
Boston.39 These cities had two assets in common: an established 
venture capital industry and an array of universities, research 
institutes and teaching hospitals whose scientists were working at 
the forefront of molecular biology. Scores of new firms were created. 
Some were later acquired, but others, such as Gilead, founded in 
California in 1987, went on to become industry leaders.    
The progress of the sector was by no means smooth. Investor 
sentiment towards biotech fluctuated wildly, often in response to 
successes or failures in leading firms. The most spectacular boom-
and-bust occurred in 2000-2001, when the imminent completion of 
the Human Genome Project raised hopes that the new genomics 
technology would unleash a wave of innovative drugs. When the 
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realisation dawned that many years of development would be 
necessary before genomics-based drugs came to the market, share 
prices dropped precipitously.     
Over the next few years the flow of capital into the sector slowed 
down. There was also a change in the relationship between biotech 
and Big Pharma. In the early days there had been speculation that 
fast-growing biotech firms might eventually dislodge the older 
pharmaceutical companies from their dominant position as suppliers 
of medicines – a form of “creative destruction” that had taken place 
in parts of the electronics industry. But while biotech firms might 
have the edge in drug discovery and early stage research, many of 
them were dependent on one or two drug candidates, which made 
them more fragile than the broadly based pharmaceutical companies. 
Big Pharma had other strengths – in clinical development, and in 
marketing and distribution – which most biotech firms could not 
hope to match.  
Moreover, by the 1990s the earlier scepticism in Big Pharma about 
biotechnology had given way to a recognition that this new approach 
to drug discovery had to be integrated into their own operations. In 
1990, Roche, the Swiss group, acquired 60 per cent of Genentech for 
just over $2bn, with an option to buy the remaining shares at a later 
date. This deal was one of a series of partnerships and acquisitions 
that altered the structure of the biotech sector. By the end of the 
decade, several of the pioneering firms had been wholly or partly 
absorbed into Big Pharma. From that generation only Amgen, Biogen 
and Genzyme remained fully independent.40  
However, this did not mean that biotech was becoming a mere 
appendage of the pharmaceutical industry. Although the flow of 
capital into the sector fell sharply in the early 2000s, new firms 
continued to be formed, and some of them had ambitions to become 
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large, free-standing companies, as Amgen and Biogen had done. New 
scientific opportunities were emerging from academic research in 
such areas as gene therapy, and small, agile biotech firms seemed 
better equipped to exploit them than large, bureaucratic 
pharmaceutical companies.   
One analyst noted in 2012 that the public biotech sector had finally 
achieved sustained profitability after many years of losses, and that 
investors could look forward to a further period of improved 
performance.41 He pointed to several factors which justified an 
optimistic view: a more favourable regulatory climate; the 
development of speciality drugs for severe diseases, including 
targeted cancer therapies and treatments for hepatitis C; the 
likelihood that more of these drugs would become “mega-
blockbusters”, with sales exceeding $2bn a year; and the prospect of 
increasing sales in emerging markets. 
 
The biotech boom of 2014-2015 
For these and other reasons, investor sentiment swung back in 
favour of biotech, leading to a remarkable boom in share prices, and 
in the number of flotations, in 2014 and 2015. Although the boom 
petered out in 2016, its effect was to reinforce the position of the 
US as the global centre of biotech innovation and investment. With 
the emergence of four large, profitable companies at the top end – 
Amgen, Biogen, Gilead and Celgene - the structure of the industry 
was less fragile than it had been ten years earlier. Below the big four 
there was a group of sizeable companies, including Regeneron, 
Alexion and Vertex, which seemed capable of joining the top league.     
What had emerged after forty years of often erratic progress was a 
distinct sector of the life sciences industry that had made, and was 
25   –   Lessons from the US 
continuing to make, an outstanding contribution to the development 
of innovative drugs. It was a dynamic sector that was constantly 
replenished by the flow of start-up firms coming out of universities. 
While many of these firms were likely either to fail or to be acquired 
by Big Pharma, the best of them were able to attract sufficient 
support from investors to stay independent, and in a few cases to 
achieve a market capitalisation as high as that of the leading 
pharmaceutical companies.  
Many biotech firms were created in Europe during this period, some 
of them supported by their governments. But the US biotech sector 
has remained far ahead in the number of companies, and in the size 
and sophistication of the investment community which support 
them. To an even greater extent than in information technology, the 
US has been a magnet for biotechnology entrepreneurs and 
investors from the rest of the world.   
 
The role of public policy  
US success in biotechnology is intimately linked to government 
support for scientific research. This is partly because of the close 
connection between academic science in molecular biology and 
genetics and the new approach to drug discovery. It also reflects the 
sheer scale of government spending on biomedical research, far 
larger than that of other industrial countries (Table 1). An important 
feature of this support has been its consistency. Whereas support 
from venture capital and the stock market was volatile, there was 
little variability in the growth of NIH funding between 1980 and the 
late 1990s.42 
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Table 1: National expenditure on academic and related research in 




% of total 
academic research 
spending 
US 7,285 48.9 
Germany 1,483 36.7 
France 1,116 34.7 
UK 864 30.9 
Japan 1,261 33.7 
 
The NIH was mainly focused in the early years on pure or 
fundamental research aimed at generating knowledge about how the 
body works rather than finding cures for disease. But from the 1970s 
onwards, the agency played a bigger role in the applied phase of drug 
discovery. According to a recent study, just over 20 per cent of all 
drugs approved by the Federal Drug Administration between 1990 
and 2007 had their origins in the NIH and other public sector 
institutions, the rest coming from research carried out by private 
sector firms.44 
The NIH was a valuable partner for the emerging biotech sector, not 
only as a provider of knowledge but also in enabling universities to 
expand their teaching and research in the disciplines that were 
coming to the fore at that time, including bioinformatics, genetics 
and bioengineering. This nurtured a skilled workforce that could find 
employment either in academia or in business – or in a combination 
of the two. “The highly interdependent nature of the life sciences 
innovation network has the consequence that a period of 
employment in the private sector need not come at expense of 
returning to public sector scientific employment in the future”.45    
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The links between universities and business were strengthened by 
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which was described in the last section. 
Other measures taken during the 1980s, though not specifically 
directed at biotech, were helpful to the growth of the sector.46 These 
included the creation of the SBIR and the change in the rules 
governing pension funds, allowing them to invest  in venture capital 
on a larger scale.    
The sector also benefited from changes in the arrangements for 
regulating drug safety and efficacy. One was the introduction of the 
Orphan Drug Act, designed to encourage firms to develop medicines 
for rare diseases - defined as those that affected less than 200,000 
people. For firms that developed orphan drugs, the Act provided a 
seven-year period of exclusivity, faster approval procedures and tax 
incentives that partially offset the cost of research. Several biotech 
firms, notably Genzyme, focused much of their development effort 
on orphan drugs, where there was less competition from Big Pharma 
and less need for a large sales force.  
As an incentive for innovation patents have been much more 
important  in biotechnology than in information technology. Patent 
rights over new molecules are generally “straightforward to obtain, 
to delineate and to defend”, and they play a crucial role in allowing 
innovators to appropriate returns from their research.47 The 
intellectual property regime was strengthened by the Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984, which set out clearer rules on patent 
exclusivity and strengthened the ability of generic drug 
manufacturers to enter the market when the patent expired.  
The incentives arising from patents are reinforced in the US by the 
absence of government controls over prices. While the high prices 
charged by manufacturers for drugs have recently come under heavy 
criticism in Congress and elsewhere, and some changes in the system 
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may be made by the Trump administration, the pricing freedom that 
the industry enjoys is one of the factors to encourage non-American 
suppliers to launch their drugs first in the US. Another is the speed 
with which new drugs, once approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration, can be put on the market. In the European Union, 
even after a drug has been approved by the European Medicines 
Agency, the manufacturer has to negotiate prices with national 
governments, all of which have their own reimbursement regimes. 
The US has an integrated market for medicines, regulated in a way 
that stimulates intense competition - on the basis of therapeutic 
value rather than price - and generates large rewards for the winners.  
In its approach to publicly funded research in biomedical science and 
its exploitation, the US has relied more on initiatives coming out of 
the scientific community, and from firms, than on top-down direction 
from the government or its agencies. There have been some top-
down projects, such as the NIH’s artificial heart programme in the 
1960s and President Nixon’s War on Cancer in 1971 - both were 
partly motivated by the Apollo moon-landing programme - but they 
have had only limited success.48 The unpredictable nature of the 
drug development process does not lend itself to government 
planning.  
 
Implications for the UK  
There is a widely held view that the UK, given its strength in 
biomedical science, should have done better in biotechnology – 
better, that is, in terms of developing and bringing to market big-
selling drugs and in fostering the emergence of medium-sized or 
large biotech firms comparable to those in the US. It is certainly true 
that after an apparently promising start in the 1980s and 1990s the 
UK biotechnology sector failed to generate enough successes to 
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retain the support of local investors and as a result the flow of capital 
into the sector declined from the early 2000s. With limited access to 
finance at home, some of the more promising firms either moved to 
the US or sold out to pharmaceutical companies. There was a revival 
of investor interest in 2014 and 2015, partly as a spill-over from the 
biotech boom that was taking place in the US, but today the gap 
between the US and the UK remains as wide as it was at the start of 
the millennium.  
The gap is as much a European as a British phenomenon. 
Biotechnology is unusual in the extent and persistence of US 
dominance, and this partly reflects features of the US environment 
that cannot be replicated in the UK or in any other European 
country. The UK cannot hope to match the scale of government 
support for biomedical research that is provided by the NIH, nor, 
given the financial pressures on the National Health Service, can it 
offer the same level of reward for innovative drugs as the US.  
The focus of government policy has to be on making the best 
possible use of one of the UK’s most valuable assets, its high-quality 
biomedical research, and on creating an environment that facilitates 
the commercialisation of academic discoveries. This means 
encouraging universities to become more entrepreneurial and 
improving the flow of finance for start-up and early-stage firms.  
How many of these firms grow into medium-sized or large 
companies is a matter over which the Government has no control. 
Creating a British equivalent to an Amgen or a Biogen is almost 
certainly not a feasible objective, but there have been concerns that 
too many of the UK’s biotech firms have been sold too early and 
often to non-British companies before they have achieved their full 
potential. This is blamed, by some commentators, on a chronic 
tendency towards short-termism in the British financial system; the 
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Government has recently set up the Patient Capital Review, which 
will investigate the problems faced by innovative firms as they seek 
to scale up. But biotech is a global industry, and the UK sector has 
benefited from the inflow of capital from non-British sources such as 
the US and Japan.  Preserving national ownership is less important 
than maintaining and improving the attractiveness of the UK as a 
location for discovering and developing innovative medicines. 
An important lesson from US experience, apart from the specific 
measures discussed earlier, is the need to provide a stable 
framework on which scientists, entrepreneurs and investors can rely. 
The US life sciences innovation system has been built up over a long 
period, reflecting policy choices that for the most part have been 
supported across the political spectrum.49 In biotechnology, as in 
innovation policy more generally, there is no scope for quick fixes.  
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Conclusion   
The two industries discussed in this paper represent only one aspect 
of US innovation policy. There are other areas - for example, 
advanced manufacturing – where the performance of US firms has 
been less impressive.50 There are also important differences between 
biotech and information technology  that limit the scope for 
generalisation. The extent of government regulation is more 
extensive in biotech, and the interaction of biotech firms with 
academia is much closer. Nevertheless, there are common elements 
in the two stories that highlight some of the distinctive features of 
the American system.   
Two aspects of public policy are worth emphasising. The first is the 
need to avoid over-centralisation in innovation policy. The US has 
benefited from the existence of a number of funding agencies with 
different missions and priorities. While the UK cannot replicate that 
structure, and the allocation of funds will always be influenced by 
political or social concerns, governments should be wary about trying 
to steer research in preconceived directions.  
A second, related point is the limited relevance of the top-down 
model used in the Manhattan and Apollo projects – projects where 
the goal is identified, planned and funded by the government. In 
industries where technology is advancing rapidly and in uncertain 
directions, success generally depends on multiple sources of initiative 
and innovation. Some of the initiatives may come from established 
companies, but new entrants are often better equipped to identify 
and exploit new lines of research.  
For the UK, US experience in information technology and 
biotechnology reinforces the case for maintaining a strong science 
base, supported by publicly-funded research. But it also underlines 
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the importance of a vibrant and competitive private sector, which 
encourages new science-based firms to get started and grow. This 
points to the need to improve the UK’s innovation system in three 
ways. First, public procurement should be geared more actively 
towards the encouragement of new entrants. Second, Government 
should seek to remove any obstacles, whether arising from the tax 
system or other factors. that limit the access of growing firms to 
external sources of finance. Third, the entrepreneurial role of 
universities should be strengthened, making their   technology 
transfer offices more efficient and their interaction with business 
more productive.    
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